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Abstract
Philosophy from a number of pragmatist thinkers—notably Charles S. Peirce—on the
interaction between world and individual parallels Buddhist doctrines. Comparison of these
two systems allows for deeper understanding of both. Through interaction with the work of
current comparative philosophers as well as analysis of the work of Charles S. Peirce I display
the kinship of pragmatism and Buddhism. It is my hope that these comparisons will strength
cultural exchange between the East and the West.
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Introduction
Western philosophy has a long history of discrediting or outright ignoring
perspectives from other parts of the world. Hegel famously disregarded the philosophical
works of China and India as being “outside the World’s History.”1 Philosophy courses of
innumerable colleges and universities embrace roughly the same canon: Aristotle, Plato,
Descartes, Kant, Hume and many other European thinkers are given primary focus. Where
consideration of non-European ideas is even made available, it is done so through
specialized courses (Asian Philosophy, for instance) that may only be offered rarely. As
frustrating as this seeming close-mindedness is, all is not lost. It seems that Western
philosophy is growing more and more willing to broaden its horizons as time goes on.
The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st has seen the field of
comparative philosophy grow by leaps and bounds. Its goal is simple, but complex: to
provide a deeper appreciation for non-European ideas (primarily from Asian thinkers) by
drawing parallels between these ideas and counterparts in the West. The goal is not to
legitimize Western notions with Eastern ideals; rather, comparative philosophers seek to
show that as interesting and noteworthy as Western concepts may be, they are
occasionally—if not frequently—formulated by an Eastern counterpart during a similar
timespan or hundreds of years prior. One area of comparative philosophy that receives a
fair amount of time and focus is the comparison between American pragmatism and
Buddhism. While work has been done to connect both William James2 and John Dewey3 to
schools of Buddhism, I believe the field can be further expanded to the work of Charles
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. The Philosophy of History, 133.
Miranda Shaw, "William James and Yogācāra Philosophy: A Comparative Inquiry."
3 Gregory M. Fahy, "Huayan Buddhism and Dewey: Emptiness, Compassion and the Philosophical Fallacy."
1
2
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Sanders Peirce, often heralded as the father of pragmatism. Connecting Peirce to Buddhism
brings the last of the “big three” early pragmatists into the fold and deepens the connection
between Buddhism and pragmatism.
To what extent is a comparison between American pragmatism and Buddhism
useful? What objections are there to these comparisons and on what grounds are they
raised? Ultimately, where does the comparison between pragmatism and Buddhism leave
practitioners of both schools? I hope to answer these questions in this paper and display
the skillful means by which comparison may pave the road to greater understanding.
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Main Argument and Thesis
I will maintain in this paper that philosophy from a number of pragmatist
thinkers—notably Charles S. Peirce—on the interaction between world and individual
parallels Buddhist doctrines. Comparison of these two systems allows for deeper
understanding of both. I provide the following argument for my thesis:
1. The metaphysical similarities between American pragmatism and schools of
Buddhist thought are profound.
2. Either these similarities are coincidental with no deeper meaning or these
similarities indicate a shared metaphysical basis that, when studied, deepens
understanding of both schools of thought.
3. The similarities between American pragmatism and Buddhism are too myriad and
too deep to dismiss as meaningless coincidence.

4. Therefore, similarities between American pragmatism and Buddhism indicate a
shared metaphysical basis that, when studied, deepens understanding of both
schools of thought.
The sharing of a metaphysical basis refers to the notion that both pragmatism and
Buddhism share perspectives on the world that guide the thoughts of both schools along
similar paths and towards similar ends. This does not mean that Buddhism is identical to
pragmatism nor pragmatism to Buddhism, nor is it an attempt to legitimize Buddhism’s
induction to the Western canon by comparison. Rather, this argument and the comparisons
that compose it display that both Buddhism and pragmatism can learn a great deal from
each other while maintaining their individual identities.
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Given this thesis and its supporting argument, I will begin by considering Michael
Morreau’s objection to my first premise. Morreau is critical of the act of comparison,
holding that comparison of any two differing ideas accomplishes nothing and should be
avoided.

Monroe 7

Objection 1 – Problem with Comparison
In Michael Morreau’s paper “It Simply Does Not Add Up: Trouble With Overall
Similarity”, he deals with the topic of comparison between two philosophical ideas.
Morreau holds that comparison between two ideas does not accomplish the work that
many demand of it, a stance that strikes directly at the first premise of my main argument.
As the author himself puts it, “Overall similarity is supposed to be an aggregate of
similarities and differences in various respects. But there is no good way of combining
them all.”4 Condensing some of Morreau’s work provides us with the following argument:
1. Similarity is relative and comparative.
2. If similarities cannot overcome differences then comparison does not do the
work philosophy asks of it and leads to no useful conclusions on a subject.
3. Greater similarity in one respect does not make up for less similarity in another
respect.
4. Therefore, there can be no combining of the various similarities and differences
of things into useful comparisons of any level of similarity.
Morreau’s conclusion refutes my third premise. My entire argument hinges on combining,
comparing and relating similarities between different ideologies; without comparison my
paper—as well as the entirety of comparative philosophy—flounders and dies. Fortunately,
Morreau’s criticism is not insurmountable. I will consider a weakness in the construction of
his argument and pose a counterargument of my own in order to ensure the continuance of
my discussion.

4

Michael Morreau. 2010. "It Simply Does Not Add Up: Trouble With Overall Similarity."
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Reply 1 – Counterargument
I object to the third premise of the above argument. Comparison of two (or more)
systems of thought is done to highlight the differences as well as the similarities. Without
differences (situations of less similarity) comparison is ultimately meaningless and yields
no deeper understanding of either system. Rendered as an argument:
1. Meaningful comparison between two systems of thought can only be
conducted when there are both similarities and differences between the two
systems.
2. There are large differences between Buddhism and American pragmatism.
3. There are large similarities between Buddhism and American pragmatism.
4. Therefore, meaningful comparisons of similarity between Buddhism and
American pragmatism can be conducted.
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Objection 2 – Richard Rorty
As hopeful as my thesis portrays the comparison of pragmatism and Buddhism, it is
not immune to criticism. Ironically enough, one of the strongest criticisms of comparative
philosophy I could find comes from one of contemporary pragmatism’s elite, Richard Rorty.
As reported by John Holder:
… [Rorty] said that he had tried to read Confucius, but despite his best efforts,
Confucian doctrines remained opaque to him… Rorty said that he cannot relate
discussions of Confucian thought to his own inquiries without doing an injustice to
the Asian traditions under study. He went on to generalize his experience by saying
that this is likely to be true of all cross-cultural comparisons—that every
philosopher is so deeply grounded in her or his cultural context that there is little
hope of having a fruitful philosophical dialogue across incommensurable cultural
contexts… by suggesting that Western philosophers should talk only with other
Western philosophers…5
Despite Rorty’s focus on the works of Confucius, the principle he employs remains the same
and runs entirely counter to my thesis: Western philosophy should talk to itself, Eastern
philosophy should do the same and incommensurability maintains this divide. Rendering
Rorty’s comments into a more standard form provides us with the following argument:
1. Two systems of thought are incommensurable when cultural context prevents
meaningful discussion between members of said systems.
2. If two systems of thought are incommensurable, members of each system should
converse only with those they share a background with.
5

John Holder. "The Purpose and Perils of Comparative Philosophy." (40)
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3. Western thought and Eastern thought are incommensurable.
4. Therefore, Western philosophers should talk only to other Western philosophers
and Eastern philosophers should only converse with Eastern philosophers.
Though Rorty’s argument primarily strikes against my thesis it is also damaging to my first
premise. The entire crux of my argument relies on the existence of metaphysical similarity
between Pragmatism, a western school of thought, and Buddhism, an Eastern one. Rorty’s
argument denies any possibility for similarity between Pragmatism and Buddhism due to
the different cultural contexts held by practitioners of each school.
Rorty’s criticism of incommensurability of systems of thought was well known and
leveled even against his intellectual inspiration, John Dewey.6 As such, it’s unsurprising to
find a similar, if more strongly put argument in this context. Though it seems damning at
first glance, I aim to show that the case against comparative philosophy is not as bleak as he
makes it seem.

6

Rorty, Richard. Rorty & Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics.
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Response 2: Peirce Comparison
I object to Rorty’s third premise, namely that Western and Eastern thought are
incommensurable. As presented in the first thesis of his argument, two systems of thought
are incommensurable when the cultural context of said systems prevents meaningful
discussion between their members. I will display that such a statement in no way applies to
the case of American pragmatism and Buddhism.
Gregory Fahy’s comparison of James Dewey and Huayan Buddhism reveals a shared
metaphysical basis focused on interrelatedness.7 Miranda Shaw delves deeply into the
work of William James as compared to Yogācāra Buddhism.8 For the purposes of my
response, I will show that the material used by Shaw in her connection of James to
Yogācāra will work just as well for Peirce. Extending this comparison to the last of the “big
three” of early pragmatists widens the base further and provides innumerable points for
discussion between pragmatism and Buddhism.
In “Some Consequences of the Four Incapacities”, Peirce talks at length about reality
and how the concept of reality, “essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without
define limits…”9 Building from the importance of community in the construction and
accrual of knowledge, Peirce considers the nature of individual consciousness and makes a
powerful statement:
“Without fatiguing the reader by stretching out the parallelism too far, it is sufficient
to say that there is no element whatever of man’s consciousness which has not
something corresponding to it in the word; and the reason is obvious. It is that the
Fahy, "Huayan Buddhism and Dewey”
Shaw, "William James and Yogācāra."
9 Peirce, Charles S. “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.”
7
8
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word or sign which a man uses is the man himself. For, as the fact that life is a train
of thought, proves that man is a sign; so, that every thought is an external sign,
proves that man is an external sign… Thus, my language is the sum total of myself;
for the man is the thought.”10
So, Peirce sees knowledge and its means of construction as being driven by community;
further, the tool of language itself is intrinsic to a person’s being, extending the person
beyond themselves into the world. The act of being itself is bound-up in what lies external
to the member of a community.
Practitioners of Buddhism in general will already be nodding their heads at the
familiar phrasing of this notion, one that sounds remarkably similar to the doctrine of
dependent origination or pratītyasamutpāda. This doctrine holds that while I am engaging
with the world, the world itself is acting upon me. Thus, my continued existence as it stands
is owed to the world around me. I—and I use the individual pronoun loosely, remembering
Buddhist ideas of rejection of self—owe my existence to the world in much the same way
that Peirce acknowledges the role of the community in a person’s ability to know.
First Section: Primacy of experience between Peirce and Yogācāra’s
abhutaparikalpa. Highlight the ways in which Peirce views experience, namely as the main
way we interact with the world. Highlight how we cannot separate experience from our
ways of slicing up the world.
Second Section: External world. Compare Yogācāra’s conception of ‘nothingness’—
especially quote concerning “in order for something to be empty it must first exist”—with

10

ibid
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Peirce’s ideal end of enquiry to show that Peirce and Yogācāra do acknowledge an external
world.
Third Section: The usefulness of pragmatism and arthakriyā. Talk about Peirce’s
pragmatic maxim and Buddhism’s desire to end suffering.
In the previous sections I have outlined the relationship between C.S. Peirce and
Yogācāra Buddhism as a response to Richard Rorty’s criticism of comparative philosophy.
These comparisons have made use of source material from Peirce and Yogācāra Buddhism,
touching base with the core of both bodies of thought to ensure an authentic
representation of their voice. Further, these comparisons have shown that while the
cultural contexts of Yogācāra Buddhism and Peirce’s pragmatism are distinct they are by
no means insurmountable nor incommensurable. There are real grounds for dialogue
between Peirce and Buddhism, with comparisons of the two providing a deeper
understanding of their similarities, differences, strengths and weaknesses in thought.
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Conclusion
In this paper I have responded to Michael Morreau’s criticism of comparison
between two philosophical ideas. I displayed the weakness of Morreau’s argument and how
the work of comparative philosophy can provide real benefits to the field of philosophy.
Additionally, I have responded to Richard Rorty’s criticism of comparative philosophy by
considering the relationship between Charles S. Peirce and Yogācāra Buddhism. I did this
by drawing on a number of Peirce’s works, ultimately displaying the shared metaphysical
between pragmatism and Buddhism. This comparison is made even more impressive
thanks to the separation of pragmatism and Buddhism by time and cultural context. But
where does this comparison leave us? What has been accomplished by reaching across
more than a thousand years of history to connect pragmatism and Buddhism?
Pragmatism is lauded for its inventive approach to philosophical problems. Focus on
communal construction of the world, openness to different ideas and the placing of value
on “what works” are all considered inventive notions that seem to pay real dividends.
However, the resources utilized in this paper have shown that Buddhism has held these
ideas for more than a thousand years. Had Western philosophers been more open to crosscultural exchange, the use of these concepts and the dialogues that result from them might
have been available many, many years ago.
Philosophical ideas work best when they have other ideas to talk to. Though an idea
may be cultivated and grown in a vacuum, the true test of its mettle is its interaction with
differing—and at times dissenting—opinions. The way forward for Western philosophy lies
in the acknowledgement, appreciation and study of modes of thought different from our
own.
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